Courts typically base compensation for loss of income in personal injury cases on either mean or median work income. Yet, quantatively, mean and median incomes are typically very different. For example, in the US median income is 65 percent of mean income. In this paper we use economic theory to determine the relation between the appropriate makewhole (full) compensation and mean and median work incomes. Given that consumption uncertainty associated with compensation generally exceeds that associated with work income, we show that the appropriate make-whole compensation exceeds mean (and therefore median) work income. Hence, if the compensation must be either the mean or the median work income, then mean work income should be selected.
Introduction
The appropriate compensation for work-income loss in personal injury cases has been of interest to the legal profession at least since biblical times. Moreover, in today's modern economies human capital tends to be substantially larger than other forms of capital. 1 Indeed, personal injury and medical malpractice torts appear to occupy a signi cant percentage of lawyers' time and of the time devoted by courts to civil litigation. According to IBIS World (2019), the annual revenue of the personal-injury segment of the law profession is $34.7 billion dollars, which constitutes over 10% of the revenue of the whole legal profession. 2 Furthermore, this issue has become a major component of forensic economics.
This problem involves a what-would-have-been reality, since future work income is not known with certainty, and similarly, the return on any compensation for the injury is uncertain. In view of this, the appropriate compensation must be based on statistical considerations. Courts have therefore typically based awards on statistical measures, mainly mean or median work income, 3 but without meaningful grounding in economics. 4 Indeed, there appears no uniformity in court choices between mean or median income.
Sometimes the justi cation given by the court for using mean or median income is passive, i.e., it is based on the fact that neither side objected to the measure at hand. 5 For example, one court states 6 \Using the statistical average, [named expert] placed Plainti 's pre-injury earning capacity at ... per year ... In fact, having found no basis for straying from the lost earnings gure [i.e., the statistical average] suggested ..."
whereas another court states 7 \... This gure was derived from the median earnings ... There was no testimony to contradict these gures, and we nd no abuse in the trial court's award."
Sometimes, the court's choice appears to be anchored in law. In a Workers' Compensation case the ruling was 8 \The panel nds that, as per policy, the worker's compensation should be based on the average earnings, not the median earnings, as determined by the Alberta Wage Survey."
In at least one case, the court appears to appeal for guidance on this matter, stating 9 \Median or average? I am unaware of any discussion as to which measure is more appropriate in a case such as the present. In the main, judges have used average weekly earnings as the relevant yardstick although the Court has been told that there are instances where the median has been chosen. Should one be preferred to the other as a matter of principle? ... That evidence would have explained the statistical concepts and explored (in greater detail than I have) the full reasons for the di erence between median and average (or mean) in the particular context at hand."
In contrast, some courts appear to have an opinion on the matter and to justify it. One court chooses the median, stating 10 \... as it seems to me, the median gure rather than the average pay provides better guidance as to what the claimant might have earned in that this discounts the in uence of any remuneration that was extremely high or low;" Whereas another court prefers the mean, for, it appears, much the same reason as the court mentioned above prefers the median. This court states 11 \. . . the way that [named expert] calculated the income is not acceptable because he used a method that simply cut down costs without justi cation. For example, he used a median income for persons who had not nished high school working in unskilled labour careers rather than an average. This had the result of using a lower income gure ... In addition, use of median incomes takes others out of the income calculation group." And continuing \ ... using the average incomes of persons in these elds of work as shown in Government of Canada statistics is reasonable and does not distort or in ate the income . . . "
The seemingly haphazard way in which the courts appear to choose between mean and median work income is surprising: the di erence between mean and median work income is quantitatively signi cant. For example, in Canada, median work income for all individuals is 76.5 % of mean work income and in the US the median is 64.7% of the mean. 12 Also, while the di erence between the two measures tends to decline when the income category is more re ned, it generally remains considerable. For example, the median work income of 45-54 years old males with a university BA degree who works full time in Canada is 77.1% of such males' mean work income, and in the US this ratio is 86.2%. 13 Notwithstanding the above, we are not aware of any research which provides a rigorous economic analysis of the mean versus median issue. 14 This paper uses economic theory to determine the appropriate make-whole compensation for work-income loss incurred by a person who has been injured or otherwise wrongfully denied income. 15 Speci cally, we build upon and extend the work of Skogh and Tibilette (1999) , who argue that, since lost future income is uncertain \ . . . the risk-averse victim will be made whole by a compensation smaller than the present value of the stream of 12 Statistics Canada (2011) and Social Security Administration (2014).
13 Some estimates of the di erence between mean and median work income are even larger. For example, see Spizman (2013) who states that \Comparing ACS [median] and PINC-04 [mean] tables show that mean earnings are always greater than median earnings. The magnitude of the di erence varies from a low of 9.74% to a high of 59.48% depending on the plainti 's age and educational level." uncertain lost earnings." Our purpose is to develop this insight further, and use it to consider whether median or mean work income better approximates risk-aversion-discounted makewhole compensation. In particular, we suggest that the real value of the compensation itself is, in the long run, uncertain. Such uncertainty militates for greater compensation for risk-averse individuals. Hence, risk aversion might act to increase rather than reduce the compensation. It transpires that, in a simple model, it is possible to provide some tentative answers to the apparently unanswered question, is the mean or median a better measure of make-whole compensation?
We view the issue of compensation within the framework of a one-period model, 16 a lognormal income distribution function, and a constant relative risk aversion utility function. 17 We focus on an injury that has rendered a person completely unable to work. 18 Our approach builds on corrective justice, which is the traditional and natural idea that the role of the compensation is to make the injured person whole again. 19 Speci cally, we calculate the lump-sum compensation that will make an injured person whole again, i.e., indi erent to not having been injured, in terms of expected utility from consumption. 20
The transition from a state of non-injury to a state of compensated injury changes the type of income uncertainties facing an individual. Speci cally, in the absence of injury, a person faces work-income uncertainty resulting from the fact that the realization of work income, which is a draw from that person's future income distribution, is not known in advance. In contrast, in the compensated injured state a person faces real-compensation (i.e., consumption) uncertainty emanating from uncertainty in the real rate of return on the lumpsum compensation awarded. 21 We nd that the appropriate make-whole compensation depends on the uncertainties of the consumption facilitated by work income and by the compensation awarded, as well as on the degree of risk aversion.
For accepted values of relative risk aversion (i.e., greater than unity), 22 high workincome uncertainty reduces the appropriate make-whole compensation, whereas high realcompensation uncertainty increases it. The reason is that a risk-averse person bene ts from the balancing of the uncertainties associated with consumption in di erent states of the world. Therefore, if work-income uncertainty exceeds real-compensation uncertainty, a smaller make-whole compensation will be required. Conversely, if consumption in the injured state is more uncertain, a greater make-whole lump-sum compensation will be required. As discussed later in this paper, compensation uncertainty appears to be greater than work income uncertainty. Our analysis therefore suggests that the make-whole compensation exceeds mean work income.
To summarize, this paper attempts to determine whether mean or median income is more appropriate in terms of making an injured person whole again. What the paper does not do is search for an incentive based or socially e cient compensation. One of the main reasons for this is that, typically, courts try to determine make-whole compensation rst. Once this is done, they determine liability and assign only a proportion of such compensation to the injured party if that party is deemed not to have taken appropriate care. It is these rules 21 Real compensation is the term we use for the consumption facilitated by the original compensation when the uncertainty in the real rate of return has been resolved. 22 Chiappori and Paiella (2011) nd that relative risk aversion is likely to exceed two, and Barro and Jin (2011) estimate relative risk aversion to be four. Meyer and Meyer (2005) provide a list of estimates. 6 that determine appropriate care and thereby act as an incentive to e ciency.
The Model
Let y denote the uncertain (real) work income of an individual who is not involved in an accident. Naturally, y depends on several parameters including the individual's age, gender, education, profession, work history, 23 and other personal characteristics, as well as on economy-wide variables such as technological developments and economic growth. In addition, as pointed out by Van Wijck and Winters (2001) and further analyzed by Singh (2004), 24 the uncertainty in y also must capture the probabilities of future non-compensable accidents and other random reductions in the ability to work, as well as the impact of any incentives provided to avoid accidents. 25 To capture the inherent uncertainty in a person's work income, we assume that y is lognormally distributed with mean M and coe cient of variation (e 2 1) 1=2 , i.e., that y (ln M 1 2 2 ; 2 ), where is the cumulative lognormal distribution. Hence, the median of y is M M e 2 =2 and a greater 2 indicates a more uncertain distribution of work income.
The individual faces a probability 2 (0; 1) of an accident, wrongfully caused by another, that will result in a complete inability to work. If such an accident occurs, the individual is awarded a lump-sum compensation A. Upon receipt, A is invested and the real value of the compensation is Az, where z captures the uncertainty concerning the consumption that is facilitated by the lump-sum compensation. This uncertainty encompasses nancial developments of purchasing power, interest rates, etc. We assume that z is lognormally distributed with mean equal to one and coe cient of variation equal to e s 2 1 1=2 , i.e.,
z
( 1 2 s 2 ; s 2 ). Hence, a greater s 2 indicates a more uncertain real compensation. The individual's utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion S > 0 and is n 1 S 1 =(1 S) if S 6 = 1 and ln n if S = 1, where n = y for an individual not involved in an accident, and n = Az for an individual involved in an accident. Therefore, using that if S 6 = 1 then y 1 S is lognormally distributed with ln M 1 2 2 (1 S); 2 (1 S) 2 and has the mean M 1 S e S(S 1) 2 =2 , the individual's no-injury expected utility is 8 > > < > > :
Similarly, if S 6 = 1 then z 1 S is lognormally distributed with 1 2 s 2 (1 S); s 2 (1 S) 2 and has the mean e S(S 1)s 2 =2 . Therefore, the individual's compensated injury expected utility is 8 > > < > > :
To determine A we assume that the purpose of the compensation is to make the victim whole, i.e., to bring the victim back to the level of expected utility (from work income) absent the accident. This requires certainty equivalence between the states of no-injury and of compensated injury. 26
Making the Victim Whole
The make-whole compensation, A, is obtained by setting (1) equal to (2). This implies that
where (s 2 2 )=2. The make-whole compensation is therefore proportional to mean work income, M , and depends on the uncertainties of work income and of real compensation.
If there is no uncertainty in the real make-whole compensation, i.e., if s 2 = 0, then A = M e S 2 =2 . Thus, the greater the uncertainty of work income, and therefore the smaller the expected utility derived from it by a risk-averse individual, the smaller is the make-whole compensation. Hence, 2 has a negative impact on A. Furthermore, the more risk averse the individual, i.e., the greater is S, the greater is the absolute (negative) e ect of an increase in 2 on A. Recalling that median work income is M e 2 =2 , the make-whole compensation equals the median work income if S = 1. Also, if S > 1, the make-whole compensation is smaller than the median work income, and the greater is S, the more distant it is from the median. Last, if S < 1, the make-whole compensation is greater than median work income; and the smaller is S, the more distant is A from the median.
If there is no uncertainty in work income, i.e., 2 = 0, but there is uncertainty in the real make-whole compensation, i.e., s 2 > 0, then A = M e Ss 2 =2 . This implies that the greater the uncertainty in the real compensation, the smaller the expected utility derived by a risk-averse individual from a given lump sum, and therefore the larger the make-whole compensation. Hence, s 2 has a positive impact on A, and, in this case, a greater S implies a greater make-whole compensation.
In reality, both uncertainties are likely to be present, i.e., 2 > 0 and s 2 > 0, and their combined e ects are captured by . If = 0, the two uncertainties neutralize each other.
Therefore, the make-whole compensation is not impacted by the degree of risk aversion and equals mean work income, i.e., A = M independently of the risk aversion.
If > 0, the uncertainty in work income is outweighed by the uncertainty in real compensation. In this case, therefore, the compensated injured individual has exchanged a stream of income for one that is more uncertain. To ensure that expected utility is the same in both the non-injured and the injured states of the world, the make-whole compensation must be greater than mean work income, i.e., A > M . Conversely, if < 0, then the victim's make-whole compensation must be less than mean work income, i.e., A < M .
The sign of therefore determines the direction of the deviation of the make-whole compensation from the mean work income. As can be seen from (3), S determines the extent of this deviation. Therefore, in e ect, S is a scaling factor that causes the impact on A of the di erence in the two types of uncertainty to increase with the individual's risk aversion.
While provides su cient information to determine the relation between make-whole compensation and mean work income, it does not always provide su cient information to determine the relation between make-whole compensation and median work income. This is because captures the net e ect of the two uncertainties on the make-whole compensation, whereas median work income, M e 2 =2 is a function of 2 but not s 2 .
If S < 1, then 2 has a smaller proportional e ect on the make-whole compensation than on median work income, M . Also, as shown above, if S = 1 and s 2 = 0, then A = M . Hence, since s 2 has a positive e ect on the make-whole compensation and no e ect on median work income, if s 2 = 0 then S < 1 implies that A > M ; and if s 2 > 0, then S = 1 implies that A > M .
If S > 1, then 2 has a greater proportional e ect on the make-whole compensation than on median work income. Since s 2 always has a positive e ect on A and no e ect on M , the relative magnitudes of A and M depend on the values of 2 , s 2 , and S. In particular, if S > 1 we have A R M as Ss 2 =(S 1) R 2 . Speci cally, whenever < 0, greater S and 2 imply that less income is needed in the injured state in order to keep the victim whole.
Since the median is less than the mean with a lognormal distribution, for su ciently high S and 2 , the make-whole compensation becomes so low that it is not only less than M but even less than M . 27 27 The distribution of the real make-whole compensation, Az, is ln M + S 1 2 s 2 ; s 2 , which has mean Assuming s 2 > 0; the characteristics of the make-whole compensation and its relationship to the mean and the median work income are summarized in Figure 1 
Concluding Comments
The main message of this paper is that the uncertainties associated with work income and real compensation as well as the risk aversion of the injured individual play major roles in determining the make-whole compensation for an injury that has caused a loss of work income.
For a risk-averse person, high work-income uncertainty implies a smaller expected utility.
Hence, the greater this uncertainty, the smaller is the make-whole compensation required to make up for the loss of work income. Conversely, the greater the uncertainty of the consumption facilitated by a given lump-sum compensation, the smaller is the expected utility from such compensation. This in turn implies that a greater real-compensation uncertainty requires a greater make-whole compensation.
These conclusions are general and transcend our model's speci c assumptions. They are independent of the lognormality of the work-income distribution and of the distribution of the consumption obtainable from the lump-sum compensation, and, similarly, they are independent of the constancy of relative risk aversion. Of course, the precise size of the make-whole compensation does depend on the speci c assumptions made.
We model real-compensation uncertainty as emanating from the uncertainty associated M e S and median M e S s 2 =2 . It is straightforward to show that an individual's expected utility decreases with the likelihood of an accident, , and with both uncertainty measures, 2 and s 2 .
with the real return to the investment of a lump sum, i.e., the uncertainty in the return to nancial capital. Such uncertainty appears to be signi cantly greater than that inherent in the return to human capital. For instance, Bucciol and Miniaci (2011) nd that the standard deviation of the percent return to human capital is 2.5% as compared with 8.7% for bonds, 17.6% for stocks, and 7.9% for real estate. 28
In addition, the injured person faces another potential major source of real-compensation uncertainty, which we have not explicitly incorporated into the model. This is the possibility that the court will incorrectly estimate the parameters of the distribution of the injured person's work income. Such uncertainty emanates from an imperfect knowledge of a particular victim's characteristics as well as from the inherent uncertainty concerning future economic developments. This ignorance is, after all, one of the major reasons for resorting to a court. And, while the point of the proceedings is to reduce the court's uncertainty, such uncertainty is unlikely to be completely eliminated. 29 Indeed, even scholars who believe that court awards are predictable, nd that the unexplained component of the variance of awards exceeds 50%. 30 Adding this source of uncertainty is equivalent to magnifying real-compensation uncertainty.
In view of the above considerations, we believe that, generally, real-compensation uncertainty exceeds work-income uncertainty. The practical implication is that for typically risk-averse individuals (whose relative risk aversion exceeds unity), the make-whole compensation exceeds mean (and therefore median) work income. Hence, if the compensation must be either the mean or the median work income, then mean work income should be selected.
28 See also Palacios-Huerta (2003) . 29 There is an ongoing discussion in the literature concerning the variance in awards. Some view verdicts as highly random. See, for example, Atiyah (1997) . Others view court verdicts as predictable and meaningfully based on economic considerations. See, for example, Osborne (1999) . 30 See Osborne (1999) . let the real value of the make-whole compensation for period t be A t e r(t 1) z t , where r is the interest rate and z t is lognormally distributed according to z t 1 2 s 2 t; s 2 t . Therefore, the mean of z t is unity for all t while its coe cient of variation, e s 2 t 1 1=2 , increases over time. The make-whole compensation A t therefore enables the individual to obtain a compensated injury expected utility 32 in period t that is equal to 8 > > > > < > > > > :
A t e r(t 1) z t 1 S 1 1 S d 1 2 s 2 t; s 2 t dz t = n A t e [r(t 1) Ss 2 =2]t o 1 S 1 1 S if S 6 = 1; Z 1 0 ln A t e r(t 1) z t d 1 2 s 2 t; s 2 t dz t = ln A t + r(t 1) 1 2 s 2 t if S = 1:
In view of (4)-(5), certainty-equivalence between the expected utility from work income and from the make-whole income from the accident compensation for each t requires that A t = M t e r(t 1)+ St . That is, the accident compensation for the rst period is A 1 = M 1 e S (the same as in the one-period case) and then changes at a rate of ln(M t+1 =M t ) r + S from period t to period t + 1. The rate of change in A t re ects the rate of change in the mean value of work income and is reduced by the interest rate r, while the period-to-period e ects of and S are the same as their one-period e ects.
We therefore have that
M t e r(t 1)+ St :
It follows immediately that the total make-whole compensation, A, increases with each M t and decreases with r. Additionally, just as in the one-period setting, A decreases with 2 and increases with s 2 , with their impacts increasing with S.
Moreover, within a multi-period setting, for each period's make-whole compensation, the insights presented within the context of the one-period model concerning the relation between mean and median work income and the make-whole compensation remain valid.
Hence, the results derived for the one-period model can be generalized.
32 For simplicity we assume that a person spends the income in the period in which it is received. 
